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STI\TEMENT OF !'.IND OF Cl\SE
This is a criminal case.

By Information filed in

thP 'i'Pnll1 Circuit Court of Sevier County,

Stiinloy Vdn Oldroyd
\1~1s

the Appellant,

(referred to hereinafter as "Oldroyd"),

cllilrqcd 11ith two crir:ies; aagravated assault,

1' r_-.l\., 19''1, :i1G-S-'03, affl assaulc: o:-: a
to l.C.ll.,

19')1,

§76-S-102.4

(R.l).

contrary to

peace officer, contrary
Proceedings in the Circuit

ruu,-t rrsul tee! in a dismissal o" the offense of assault on a
p0acc• off ic1'1-,

und Oldroyd 11as arraigned in the District Court

or 1 U": c;i11qlr' charric of aggruvated assault

(R.15).

The cuse was

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the offense
r-f "l'J' ,-ivulc-d assault

(R. 70).

The District Court sentenced

-

the payment of a

of $2,

r~!~r?

2

00.no,

.ind

i..rh· ,~~c:c'rdti{ln

ii.

county Jail for siYty days.
and judgment of the District Cou1t.

OldroyC seeks an order of this Court vacating the
judgment, and a remand to the District Court for a new trial.
He claims as error that th•' District Court failed to charge
the jury with an instruction regarding a lesser included
offense of "threatening with a dangerous weapon'',
U.C.A., 1953, §76-10-506.
Oldroy~i

contrary~

The Docketing Statement filed by

hon'in states that he \·JOuld assign as err01· for apped

the claim that the evjdence was ir:s11fficicnt to SUJmcirl a ere.viction.

A necessary element for conviction was the coml'1is;: ..

of a "threat",

as t

§76-5-102 (b).

Oldr 1

·it term is

omploycd in U.C.11.,

1 s initicd
1

th~ory

wa~~

thc1t a

1953,

threat

to be a verbal or '.nitten coni,nn:nicalion.
authorities
alone.

1101•

Lcl

Therefore,

s'"Jl'I

th0 t a

1

hrcci \

can beo premise Li on .1cu~-,

the ear lier content ion is hereby abancione:·

favor of the clairn that error 11.1s com•11ittcd in failing t:i c~:·
the jury with an instruction n•qardjnq

i'I

lesser inclC1c1ecl c:·

STATE11EN'l' UF I'/IC:'l'S

---------At the tim0 of the 0lleqed er ime Old ,-oyd was mo.rrie':
to Joan Freeman.

They had experienced marital difficC1lties

-

,,,,,1

1•1c1

3 -

c living seoerc1tc' anc1 apart.

She was residing in a base-

:ipi1rt111ent in Richfield, Utah (TR.69).

icc·1il

At approximately 8:20 p.m. on February 24, 1983,
Oldroyd uppearecl at the door to Miss Freeman's apartment.

He

ctppin-cntly requested admittance, but she declined and requested
Lhal he leave

(TR.70).

She testified that she was afraid of

him and telephoned the police for assistance (TR.71).
Oldroyd stood at the doorway for about thirty minutes
(TR.70).

lie and Miss Freeman could see one another through a

closc·d glass door, but she did not see any gun in his possession
(TF. 74) .
Officer Johr Evans of the Richfield City Police Department responded to the telephone call of Miss Freeman (TR.76,

77).

Two other officers followed him to the apartment (TR.77).

Officer Evans walked to the top of the basement stairwell which
was cla rk at the time.

lie testified that he then heard a sound

which he characterized as the cocking of a revolver (TR.77).
Using a flashlight, Officer Evans then identified
Oldroyd (TF.77,82)1 who was seated on the stairwell steps, and
dccorclinq to the Officer, Oldroyd was pointing a revolver at
(TR. 78).

him

Officer Evans then jumpted back from the stairwell
c111-J

f

ohtc1incd his radio and shotgun from his patrol car (TR. 78).

-~-

- - -·-

.

Oluroycl was a former peace officer (TR.111), and he was well
cicgu<Jintecl llith Officer Evans (TR.108).

- 4 -

He walked bc1cl;: to

tl1L'

to throw the revoJv.

sr·crn·,
Oll

t.

AfLc1·

live

tr) ciqht

rr1l11ulr·.s,

1 '~,1·,

did so (TR.79,80).
When Officer Evans observed Olclroyd in the st<ii nirll
with the revolver,

he could not de termi nr.e if l he !1c1mmer

was

in

a cocked position, ancl \·:>-ien he picked the ciun lip frc):ii. th,· qrc
the harruner was in an uncockecl p(,sision,
bullets

unc1 it

\'lLls

empt'/

c,~

(TR.82,831.
Oldroyd tool;: the stand in his own defense.

He tcst1-

fied that he stood at the doon1ay of his wife's apartment L1L ..
to her for some time before the police officers arrived

(TR.I'

He had the revolver in questiun with him at that time, but it
was 'Jnloacled.

Althouqh he had bullets in his pockc.·1, hC' ncvr:·

took them out (TR.106,107).
Because of the flashlight shining in his eyes, Oldrr
did not recognize Of Cicrer E\•ans,
uniform (TR.107).

nor did hr oLsc 1·vc

il

pol i'·r

He tcestified th;:it he did not point his rew

ver at anyone (TR.1081,

and it wu.s not his inl ent to fr iohtc11

or threaten Officcer F.vans or to CilUS<' hurt or injury to an1or:,
else (TR.108\.
Oldroyd dlso stuted that
was open at dll times c1 uri11•

the cyLind<·r of the n·v0l1":

thr· incident

never aimed the gun up the staj 1·wcll

(T1 . lCJ'J),

ancl th«'

('I;· 11 ·1)

Oldroyd requested the Court lo r;J,.ir•w the jury witL
the lesser included offense of "threiltcninq with a danqc>rous

-

11, 111, ,·u11lrc1ry to U.C.l\.,

-

')

1~~3,

576-10-S06

(R.Sl).

The Court

Tl!E TRIAL COURT CO;.tMITTED ERROR IN REFUSING THE
PROFFf:Rl-:D ,HJRY INSTRUCTION REG.',?DI'lG THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
OF "TllREJ\'J'CNING \HTH A Dl\NGE!COL;S

court

011

\·;~l\PON".

September 21, 1983, this Court discussed in depth the

standarcl 1:hich should apply in cha:::ging a jury with a lesser
include~

offense.

Oldroyd relies primarily upon the rules and

principles announced in that case as his authority herein.
In

Bake~,

supra, at 2,

t~e

Court observed that two

stawlarcls huvc developed by sta:cutory and case la1v to govern
the giving of jury instructions regarding lesser included ofiensc,.s.

One standard calls for an abstract comparison of the

st1tutory elements of the offenses in question.

The prosecution

is held to this standard.
"Thus, when the prosecution seeks instruction
on a proposed lesser included offense, both
the legal elements and the actual evidence or
inferences needed to demonstrate those elements
must necessarily be included within the original
charged offense.
13_aker, supra, at 5.

f.-.,
,111y

1

<1c;

Since all elements of law and

tu a lesser offense will

o~

necessity be present in

1·l1c1rcrincJ information or indict:nent for the greater offense,

a defendant, under this standard, is afforded the fundamentals

-

6

of noticeandopportun1ty to prep<11C? his def,·nsc.
As to the rule which shcllllcl i1nply when the clclc•r,
requests an instruction for d l e'""c•r incl 11ci1'r1 o ffc·nsc, th·,
court in Baker, supra, calls for an evidence-Liased standarcl.
The more liberal standard for the defendant was justifiecl

i~

part because:
The prosecution faces no loss of life
or liberty at trial and is nol constitutionally entitlecl to the same protections
afforded the defendant.
Baker, supra, at 5.

It was further observed that tit

benefit to the defendant of the reasonable doubt standard is
enhanced, under some circumstances, if the jury is given the
additional option of a lesser incl uJcd offense.
exists

rc~sonahle

doubt as to onn of the elements of the

gre1~

offense, but the evidence at tri .11 sholvS the dc•fenc1 int gui] tc· ''
some lesser or related offense, then the ·jury c<rn properly 'in
guilt as to the lesser o+ fd1se,

and thus <tvo.i.d on "all or

n~,fi,_

situation, whid1 would i·eciuire a decision at odds 1vith thEC e·1The Baker decision calls for

three tests to be

a defendant to be Pntitlecl to an instruction for
offense.

~

p·,ct

lesser

1

Those three tests can be stated as follows:
1.

There must exist some overlapping in the

statutory elements of the qrcater and lesser "'

1-.

in question.
2.

Evidence as received must provide a

rat10~

basis for a verdict acquitting the clcfcnclant of t~

-

3.

7 -

The ev.i dcnce as received must show a

rational basis for a conviction of the defendant
of the proffered included lesser offense.
The foregoing standards were found to be soundly based
unon the provisions of U.C.A., 1953, §76-1-402.
The evidence-based standard is applicable to the
instant case.

Oldroyd was charged with, and convicted of, a

violation of U.C.A., 1953, §76-5-103(1) (b).

That crime re-

quired the use of a deadly weapon while committing simple assault
as proscribed by U.C.A., 1953, §76-5-102.
vision dcFines two types of assault.

This latter code pro-

One is "an attempt, with

unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another",
ll.C.A.

1953, §76-5-102 (1) (a).

The other is defined as "a threat,

ctccomoa ni cd by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another", U.C.A., 1953, §76-5-102 (1) (b).

It

is this latter type of assault which Oldroyd was charged with and
con~icted.

The former kind is not at issue.

U.C.A., 1953,

The provisions of

§76-5-103 simply pro\•ide one additional element to

consider, that of the use of a deadly weapon.
The provisions of U.C.A., 1953, §76-10-506, the lesser
incl uclocl offense which Oldroyd contends should have been consid('1

eel, chZtracterizes as criminal conduct the drawing or exhibiting

of any clanc1cerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner.

Thus,

it is readily apparent, that these two statutory provisions share
h10 ccl•'n1cnts in common.

One is the element of a threat, or in a

-

threateninq manner.
fore,

8 -

ind th\' olh<'l

is

use, of

the "overla1)1)cJ1cJ" tccst rc,1uirod by B_::d;c"·,

d

T'l

JJ,,ir 1 •

s.,f,r,i,

i'" ,.,,_,

met in the instant rnattPr.
The tc3timony received at trial of Offi.cccr Cvullc; anri
Oldroyd show that the balance of the Baker test is satisfied.
Looking at that evidence "Ln a 1 iqht most fa•·orablc to the prosecution, the criminal conducL of Oldroyd can be simply stated.
He pointed a revolver a_t__a_policEO__office_£.
No shots were fired.

The prosecu'..ic••• c1oes not contend that iln~·

other act or orrunission on the part of Olclroycl contributed to ar.
element of the offense.

Using the langua<Je of U.C.l\., 195\,

§76-10- -,J6, Oldroyd exhibi tPd a dangerous wei'lpon to Officer h:

in a threi'ltening manner.

Under the fi1cts of this ci'lsc, the tw

statutes in question Dcoscribe the si'lrne co;1:luct.
In Stat_e_':'_.__'v'_e_i·cJin,

595 P.2d 8G2

(1979),

this C011rt

had occasion to cowri:irc the cri •11c of :1qqravi1tcc1 cissaul t v1ith l'
of threatening w_;_ t::h a clanqerous W"ilPOll.
aggravatecl assaul" :Ln a triil l \Ii thout a

Vc1 Jiri \·:as convic! cd ~

jury, but contended

t 11-

he was entitled to be sentenced for th0 cri.rnc prcscril,,_ccl by
U.C.A., 1953,

§76-10-506

(thrcatenin9 with a danc;erous weapon;.

His theory was that the two criminal statutes censored the
conduct and that he was entitled to be sen tenccd und0r l11"
providing the lesser penalty.

Verdin' s argument \1as rcjcclc• 1

but in so doing the Cr:•urt employed an cinalysic; or comu,irins
the abstract the stcitutory elcmECnts

0

ir

1· the t\1u crirn's in que 3 ll

-

'1,1 '·.'

~up r-d,

1 ,

r~qu i 1~<--'S

111 any

''iJ»1cd in

9 -

the u.ppJ ice:. ti on of a different standard.

event, Vcrclin,

suora,

stands on its own when

l i 11ht of the Raker clccision ancl the instant matter

tpcz11ic;c the> lesser includecl offense issue did not arise in the
coni('>:l of a reguestecl jury instruction.
0 ~ thr' Lr icr of

fact in Ve rel in,

Furthermore, the judge

su:)ra, had found facts sufficient

to 111c'ct thc clemilnd of the clements of aggravated assault which

this Court was not ilt liberty to disregilrd.
i~

f,ir di ffcrent.

The instant case

Oldroyd has been wholly denied the opportunity

for any trier of fact to entertain a consideration of a lesser
incl udc"l offense.

In VercLi:::,

the judge necessarily had to con-

sider any lesser included offenses.

The Court in that case

simply found that aqgravatccl assault had in fact been committed.
There arc obviously many and varied circumstances,
cliff,,rinrJ fn,rn the facts in this case, which would call for the
~pplicaLion

of the Code provisions defininq threateninq with a

l,1nq1,rn"1_; 1'lc>1pun, ancl not those proscribing assault.
i r

,1

',hcic~t

pc'1 c;on cl rcw an cl e°'hi bi tccl a

c111uthcr J)(crson's property,

ca;n,

and angrily threatened to

he would be guilty of threatening

with a danqcrnus weapon, and not aggravated assault.
o

11

t1,,,,,

I,,

,, ''"''

1L-,

vJcJS
L'

tlir

For example,

Futhermore,

zrn attempt on the part of the defendant, as opposed

eat,

then the other type of assault would come into

l111t ,]c,fined by U.C.A.,

1953,

§76-5-102(l)(a).

SUH'L\RY
In 13_c_c:,)(_~._ Alabamc:,

447 U.S.

625, the Supreme Court

-

I

o

, r ,-, '.__;

recoqni eccl th,1 t
only the choice of cu1, lc;\.1u1t u1
of a third option of
sometimes Jangerous
corner in this case,

Ct

~

•

'l

l

t_

~

' l I), '.

accq11iltal.

t ] '.' (

'!'11~

~\ \,

1

·1·} l

,-J L

ll

! , 1J 1 1 j i I

jnL·Judc 1 c1 offc'r1sr· s1)ft<·r

Jc:;~~r_~:

jI

I j

l! 1 , 11•

pos~tion.

Ile 1·1as prccl Utlc>d by

Court f rorn the ooport u11 i ty tu h 3 VE" the

the C'rror or t·hc Jiic'

1 ury

conduct was within t'w confines of U.C.l\.,

,·onside' r 1:hc' t hf r Ii.
l'l',3,

<i76-10-',Q6, ar,,

not such as to cons ti tut.e a fct1· more serious er i.mc.
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c•[

tb:
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